Union Industrielle et Maritime

 remonter

M/S "EGLANTINE" - Abordage INES/EGLANTINE/CREDO

Eglantine en réparation au HAVRE en septembre 1984, changement de tôles de pavois et bulbe. Collection R. Grard, cliché les Anciens Photographes du Port Autonome du Havre.

Ces réparations eurent lieu suite à un abordage dans le Pas de Calais, le 18 août 1984, avec le pétrolier norvégien "Credo" de 120.000 T en position de rattrapant. Collision provoquée suite à une manœuvre d'urgence pour éviter un navire contrevenant dans le dispositif de séparation de trafic. il s'agissait du caboteur belge "Inez" égaré dans le couloir maritime opposé à celui qu'il aurait du emprunter. 

Dégats subis par M/S "EGLANTINE".

Diaporama Réparations Eglantine Le Havre

 

LE MARIN - 24 août 1984

"DETROIT DU PAS DE CALAIS :

UN CABOTEUR BELGE PROVOQUE UN ABORDAGE ENTRE UN MINERALIER ET UN TANKER.

Vendredi dernier vers 13 H., le caboteur belge "Inez" immatriculé à Anvers, transportant du gas-oil, s'engageait dans le détroit et, a hauteur de Calais, empruntait un couloir interdit. Peut-être son commandant était-il gêné par le brouillard épais ? Aux approches du Cap Gris-Nez, il n'effectuera pas la signalisation obligatoire pour tout navire transportant des matières dangereuses, mais la radio du bord put entendre les messages lancés par le CROSS Gris-Nez demandant a la vedette des Douanes "Vent d'Aval" de quitter Boulogne et d'aller intercepter le bâtiment en infraction.

L' "Inez" se trouvait alors entre le Cap Gris-Nez et Boulogne. Se sachant en situation irrégulière, le caboteur belge rectifia son cap pour reprendre la voie normale mais il provoqua alors un abordage entre deux bâtiments de commerce, le minéralier français "Eglantine" faisant route vers Leningrad avec un chargement de 30.000 T et le tanker norvégien "Credo", un navire de 120.000T.

Le choc fut très rude et provoqua des dégâts importants aux deux navires. Le caboteur belge fut invité a gagner le port de Calais ou il a été saisi en vertu d'une ordonnance rendue par le Tribunal de Commerce du lieu, sur requête de l'armement du navire français. ... L'enquête a été diligentée par la gendarmerie maritime du quartier de Boulogne."

 

JOURNAL DE LA MARINE MARCHANDE - 23 août 1984

"UNE BARGE EGAREE DANS LE BROUILLARD AURAIT PROVOQUE LA COLLISION D'UN MINERALIER ET D'UN PETROLIER DANS LE PAS-DE-CALAIS.

Tombée en panne de radar dans l'épais brouillard qui recouvrait le Pas-de-Calais le 17 août, une barge pétrolière belge se serait égarée dans le couloir maritime opposé a celui qu'elle aurait dû emprunter. Un minéralier français, l' "Eglantine" dut alors l'éviter en virant sur tribord ce qui provoqua sa collision avec le pétrolier norvégien "Credo". Quoique sérieusement endommagés, les deux navires ont pu poursuivre leur route. L'équipage de la barge ne s'est aperçu de rien, le brouillard devait décidément être très épais. La vedette des douanes s'est chargée de l'arraisonner et l'a conduite au port de Calais où le Tribunal a pris une ordonnance de saisie pour préserver les intérêts des deux autres navires impliqués dans l'accident."

 

******

 

EVENEMENT DE MER : ABORDAGE DU M/S EGLANTINE DANS LE PAS DE CALAIS.

 

Le M/S EGLANTINE, sous les ordres du Commandant F. LE SCORNET, a appareillé le jeudi 16 août 1984 à 20 H. 25 de Rouen, avec un chargement de 24.905 T de grains, à destination de Ventspils (U.R.S.S.). Alors qu'il se trouvait le vendredi 17 dans l'ouest du cap Gris-Nez, un écho fut détecté et plotté sur l'avant tribord comme étant celui d'un navire contrevenant dans le dispositif de séparation de trafic, mais qui néanmoins devait passer clair. La visibilité, qui était alors bonne, diminuait doucement. L'allure du M/S EGLANTINE était celle d'avant toute de manœuvre.

Notant une brusque abattée de ce contrevenant sur tribord, ce qui l'amenait à couper la route de l'EGLANTINE sur l'avant, la machine a été passée immédiatement en avant lente et 1 a barre mise à droite toute afin d'éviter la collision (la distance minimale qui sépara les deux navires au cours de la manœuvre fut de 0,1 mille, le contre­venant continuant à revenir sur l' EGLANTINE).

Quelques minutes plus tard alors qu'il revenait en route, barre a gauche, un autre écho de navire, considéré comme rattrapant par l'arrière tribord, apparaissait tout proche. La barre fut mise immédiatement à bâbord toute, un coup de fouet ayant été donné à la machine. Malgré cette manœuvre du Commandant F. LE SCORNET, la collision avec ce rattrapant, un pétrolier norvégien de 120.000 TPL, le M/S CREDO, était devenue inévitable et se produisit à 13 H. 43.

Le CREDO heurta une première fois avec son milieu bâbord le gaillard tribord de l'EGLANTINE, puis une deuxième fois, avec sa hanche arrière, à hauteur des cales 4 et 5.

Le Commandant, après différents contacts avec le siège social, UNITRAMP et le CROSSMA Gris-Nez, n'ayant constaté aucune voie d'eau, reprit son voyage vers Ventspils.

Le navire contrevenant a été identifié par le CROSSMA comme étant l'INEZ, une barge pétrolière belge qui transportait 2.900 T de gas-oil. Ce navire fût très rapidement intercepté par une vedette des Douanes et conduit à Calais où il a été l'objet d'une double saisie par les Affaires Maritimes en vue d'une éventuelle inculpation pour infraction aux règles de navigation dans le détroit, et par le Tribunal de Commerce de Calais, à la suite d'une requête que nous avons effectuée.

L'EGLANTINE ayant donc continué sa route, ce n'est qu'un mois plus tard, le 17 septembre, qu'il revint à Rouen pour décharger 27.144 T de charbon polonais et qu'enfin nous avons pu constater l'étendue des dégâts.

Il faut noter que le personnel avait, dès le 17 août, commencé une partie des travaux dans les magasins tribord et sur le pont teugue, afin de faciliter le travail ultérieur des chantiers et de réduire le temps d'arrêt qui est toujours trop long au regard de l'exploitation commerciale. Entre temps, les lettres de proposition des chantiers consultés arrivaient au Service Technique. Ce fut la COGER, au HAVRE, qui, ayant proposé le devis le plus faible et étant géographiquement le mieux placé, se vit confier l'exécution des travaux de réparation qui débutèrent le vendredi 21 septembre. L'EGLANTINE fut entièrement remis en état de ces avaries en 19 jours, les travaux de tôlerie étant les plus importants : environ 35 T de tôle à changer pour la réparation du bulbe, du gaillard, du pont teugue et des magasins tribord ainsi que de la tôle de carreau des top wing tanks 4 et 5. Le navire a pu appareiller le 9 octobre dans la soirée.

Hugues-Robert GROS

 

The owners of the ship Eglantine v. The owners of the ships Credo and Inez - Q.B.D. (Adm.Ct.) (Sheen J. with Assessors) - 24 February 1989

Collision action - “Rogue” ship proceeding in wrong direction in Dover Strait in dense fog

The vessel Inez , a twin screw motorised tank barge of 1800 grt. was proceeding in the wrong direction in the traffic separation lane reserved for ships bound north-east. Conditions were extremely foggy. Inez was engaged in a voyage from Antwerp to Calais, but she had unintentionally passed Calais when she encountered the vessels Eglantine and Credo proceeding north-eastwards.

 

EGLANTINE/CREDO/INEZ

On 17 August 1984 the French flag, diesel propelled, bulk carrier Eglantine was proceeding up the Dover Strait in dense fog. She had loaded a cargo of 24005tons of grain in Rouen and was bound for Ventspils, Latvia. She was on a course of 020 making about 13.5 knots when she passed cape Griz Nez at a distance of about four miles not long after 1100. the Norwegian motor vessel Credo, a bulk carrier out of Lisbon to Mongstad, Norway was about 2.5 miles astern at the time, over taking Eglantine on a course of 039 at a speed of at least 16 knots. Credo passed  Cape Griz Nez about 10 minutes after the French vessel and was on her starboard quarter. The tide at the time was running in  a southwesterly direction at about two knots.

Two high-definition Dacal Decca radars, one located at St. Margaret’s Bay and the other atop the Dungeness nuclear power station, enable the coastguard to monitor all traffic through the Strait. Two automatic plotting units are connected to each radar whereby the courses and speeds of vessel involved in casualties can be calculated. The speeds and course changes of such vessels can thus be determined independent of ship’s re cords and this can act as a deterrent to having recourse to the courts in the resolution of disputes . in this case, however, the presence of a third vessel, Inez, whose actions contributed materially to the collision between Credo and Eglantine, required resort to the courts to resolve the question of the degree of blame of each.

Inez was a twin screw, diesel powered, motorized tank barge flying the Belgian flag and was bound from Antwerp to Calais with a cargo of fuel oil. Her master had retired in 1981at the age of 65 but subsequently tool up part time employment as relief master. This was his second voyage in that capacity. What the conditions of his previous employment were we do not know , but at least before the drastic reduction in manning that we have witnessed in recent years masters did not ordinarily take a direct part in the navigation of their vessels. The actual fixing of the ship’s position was left to the watch officers and over a period of time the master’s navigational skills, if left unexercised, might tend to atrophy.

According to a written statement and presented to the court , he did not know the ship’s position when fog set in . she was bound for Calais on a southwesterly course, but had unintentionally passed her destination and strayed into the northbound lane of the Dover Stair traffic separation scheme. In his deposition the master maintained that he first noticed Eglantine when she was little more than half-a-mile distant dead ahead, but the court rejected that contention as she began to alter course to starboard when Eglantine was still about three miles off, slightly on the starboard bow.

The third mate of Eglantine discovered Inez ahead when she was something over five miles off. It soon became apparent that she was a southbound vessel and it appeared she would pass down the starboard side if she held her course. He immediately called the master who was in his cabin below. After assessing the situation the master estimated that the southbound ship would pass about two-thirds of a mile off down the starboard side. He also became aware at this time of the presence of Credo overhauling on the starboard quarter. He was sufficiently concerned at this discovery to switch on an auxiliary whistle on the after mast. About this time Inez altered course to starboard and it appeared to the master of the French ship  that this put her on a collision course. He accordingly made a bold alteration to starboard. This was about six minutes before the collision.

    Master of the conn

Aboard Credo the master was at the conn, assisted by the second mate. The master maintained that he was at the Arpa on the port side of the wheelhouse while the second mate was stationed at the two radar sets on  the starboard side, one of which was on  the six-mile scale and the other on 12-miles scale .According to the master the Arpa, if properly programmed, would automatically acquire targets that might pose a threat and sound a warning alarm if any target would approach within a mile within the next ten minutes. No alarm sounded and the court expressed doubt if either the master or 2nd mate was keeping a proper radar lookout. There was a lookout on the starboard wing of the bridge and the vessel was being steered by autopilot. The visibility at this time was about one cable.

At about 1130 credo’s course was altered from 039 to 045 and she remained on that heading for less than one minute when her when was put hard to starboard. Both the master and the second mate claimed that at the time of the collision Credo had swung to a heading of between 070 and 080. the court rejected that testimony, however, concluding instead that the ship was on a heading of no more than 050at the time the ship sollided and that the order of ‘hard-a-starboard’ was given at the time Eglantine came into sight less than a minute before the collision.

Aboard the Eglantine the master had ordered ‘hard-a- starboard ’ at about 1135. the ship was on a heading of about 020at that time and by 1138 she had reached a  heading of 070. about a minute later she was steadied on a course of 080. there was an entry in the ship’s log that at 1134 speed was reduced to ‘slow ahead.’ The scrap log, in which nite was made of the actual manoeuvres of the vessel, shows an entry of ‘half ahead ’ at 1141. Conflicting evidence was given by the master at the trial and the court concluded that the entry in the scrap log was the true entry in the scrap log was the true indication of the vessel’s movements.

The court also rejected the testimony of both masters as to their manoeuvres prior to the collision and decided instead that the order, ‘hard-a-port’ on the Eglantine, and ‘hard-a-starboard’ on the Credo were given no more than a minute before the collision at 1142. the bow of the Credo struck Eglantine on her starboard side and whole inflicting substantial damage did not penetrate the hull. following this initial collision the port quarter of Credo came into contact with the starboard side of Eglantine between number 4 and number 5 holds.

MR Justice Sheen, who heard the case, in reaching his decision referred to the opinion of Lord Pearson in the Miraflores and the Abadesa incident, where he said, in part:

‘It is axiomatic that a person who embarks on a deliberate act of negligence should , in general, bear a greater degree of fault than one who fails to cope adequately with the resulting crisis which is thus thrust up on him. This generality is subject, of course ,to the particular facts.’

Little sympathy

Mr justice Sheen expressed little sympathy for the plight of any of the three vessels involved. They were all guilty of gross negligence: Inez for straying into the north-bound traffic lane and for failing to make a sufficiently bold alteration of course on becoming aware of the presence of the north –bound Eglantine and so precipitating the manoeuvres of Eglantine that led to the collision; Eglantine for maintaining an unsafe speed in thick fog and for failing to keep a lookout of sufficient vigilance so as to appreciate the danger into which she was heading; Credo for similar faults and for failing to reduce speed to avoid overtaking Eglantine held all three vessels equally to blame and apportioned their degree of fault as one-third each.

Mr Justice Sheen was clearly annoyed by the attempts by all of the parties involved to alter the evidence so as to show their actions in a more favorable light and that may have influenced his decision. All the participants in this affair were clearly guilty of gross negligence, but that their degree of fault was equal is less evident. Justice Sheen failed to remark on the absence of the master of Eglantine from the bridge prior to the Inez on the radar scope . had the master of Eglantine been on the bridge where he belonged, he might have had more time to make a carefully reasoned analysis of the situation confronting him. He could then have adopted a course of action to avoid the development of a close quarters situation with Credo.

Nor was the question of the inadequate manning of Inez addressed. Courts seem overly prone to accept whatever level of manning an owner chooses. Perhaps they regard this as the responsibility of the flag state in the same way they have regarded the mere possession of a valid licence       as proof of competence. The master of Inez was apparently alone on the bridge. He was not only conning the ship but was responsible for her engine movements as the engine room was unmanned. As there was no helmsman the vessel was probably in automatic steering, which meant that any alterations of course had to be made by the master. The vessel was in thick fog and the master had admittedly lost his way, but had he not been so overburdened with duties he might have been able to pay stricter attention to his overriding responsibility for the safe navigation of his vessel. Lacking any assistance he might have been overstretched in clear weather. In thick fog his only proper place was at anchor. He did not know his position, but he must have known he was in the north-bound lane of the traffic separation scheme. He could have found his way radar and echo sounder into the inshore zone where he could have anchored until visibility improved. That , however , might have been a course of action that his employer would have viewed with disapproval.

It is the court’s function to judge actions within the scope of the law, but if the law allows actions (such as inadequate manning) that lead to unlawful behaviour the surely the culprit can be charged for that offence. It is the duty of every vessel to maintain a proper lookout and it is surely no defence to claim that a lookout was not posted because the vessel’s manning was too inadequate to permit it , If the master is allowed to operate his vessel with insufficient personnel then it is not too much to expect that should he be involved in an incident that requires the judgement of a court to resolve, then the owners who sent him to sea with such a scanty crew should be held accountable and pay for the unwarranted risks they tool and the unfortunate result.

Nonetheless, these grievous faults on the part of the master of Eglantine and the master and owners of Inez seem less than that of the master of Credo. Mr. justice Sheen took note of the failure to have the lookout on the bridge wing take the wheel until there was need for a manoeuvre in extremis. He ignored, however, the fact that with the vessel underway at full speed in the Dover Strait in thick fog there should not only have been a man at the wheel but also a lookout, and that lookout should have been posted at the bow. Mr Justice Sheen came to conclusion that the order ‘hard-a-starboard’ was not given until about the time when Eglantine came into sight less than one minute before the collision. At the speed Credo was traveling she would advance about one ship length in half a minute. Had a lookout been stationed on the bow, Eglantine could have been discovered a half minute earlier and the wheel put hard over at that time and the collision thus narrowly avoided. There is also the fact that had a lookout been stationed at the bow he might have heard the whistle signals of Eglantine before she came in sight thus alerting those on the bridge to her presence close ahead.

Reduced manning

The manning of Credo had, seemingly, been reduced to the point that under routine circumstances there were only enough personnel for one person to assist the watch officer . steaming through the Dover Strait in thick fog . however, is not a routine circumstance and an additional seaman should have been assigned to assist so that both a helmsman and a lookout would have been available. While the adoption of this precaution might have been able to prevent the collision there was a simpler solution that would have required no modification in the routine of Credo.

Both the master and watch officer of the Norwegian vessel sets for an appreciable amount of time prior to the collision. Mr. justice sheen rejected that claim for the obvious reason that had they been keeping a proper radar lookout, or had the ARPA been properly set, the developing threat posed by their overtaking of Eglantine would have been discovered in ample time to defuse it.

Mr Justice Sheen was no doubt led to his conclusion by the fact that had a proper radar watch been kept on Credo, they would have discovered not only Eglantine’s change of course , but the reason for it. It is difficult to believe that two experienced and competent seamen were proceeding up the Dover Strait in thick weather paying no attention to the radar. A more likely explanation is that they knew they were overtaking another vessel on a diverging course and they made the fatal but not uncommon mistake of assuming that their respective courses would continue to diverge.

Had a proper radar lookout been kept they would have discovered Eglantine’s dangerous change of course to avoid the south-bound rogue at least several minutes before they would be confronted with an in extremis situation if action was not taken to forestall it. the proper action would have been to drop speed to the slowest manoeuvring speed and maintain that speed until it was safe to increase.

http://dzh.mop.com/topic/main/readSubMain_5335863_0.html

 

© UIM.marine - Site mis à jour le 03/06/2012   retour index  plan du site  plan archives

Si vous possédez des informations, des documents ou photographies inédites concernant un navire ou un dossier

et que vous acceptiez  de les partager en les publiant sur ce site, merci de prendre contact. uim.marine(at)free.fr

Venez partager vos connaissances sur cette compagnie ou vos souvenirs de navigants sur le forum UIM.